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This thesis operates under the framework of two theories: the realignment theory 
and the generational theory. I focus on a model of realignment developed by Arthur 
Paulson which determines three criteria that are necessary for a political realignment to 
occur: 1.) a new governing coalition, which is 2.) lasting and durable with 3.) a new 
policy agenda. A realignment can be driven by various factors, one of which being 
through generational replacement. Generational change can lead to a realignment when a 
new generation of voters emerges with unique political views that are likely to remain 
over time and cause the power to shift from one party to another. 
By using existing sources of survey data, the purpose of this research is to show 
that 1.) Millennials are a unique generation with distinct experiences and characteristics; 
and 2.) that the Millennial generation will thus bring about a realignment that meets 
Paulson’s criteria of a “new and persistent governing coalition, yielding a new policy 
agenda.” The results of this study confirm that Millennials are distinctly more 
Democratic with more progressive policy views as result of generational factors that will 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 There are specific reasons that explain nearly every major political moment and 
transformation throughout history. Each candidate, policy, and new coalition emerges to 
meet a need that the existing policies or party leaders are failing to adequately address. 
America is facing several turning points in our current society, most of which are a result 
of economic, social, and demographic changes. Even more importantly, many of these 
changes are being driven by the emergence of new generations.  
During 2019, the Millennial population is projected to become the largest adult 
population in the country as they reach 73 million people and outnumber the declining 
Baby Boomer population (Fry 2018). Along with Generation Z (those born after 1996), 
Millennials will make up thirty-seven percent of the electorate in 2020 (Cilluffo and Fry 
2019). These changes represent who votes, who runs for office, who makes the laws, and 
who has the power of the majority. 
 While it is inevitable that new generations will continually replace previous 
generations, not every generation will cause a shift in the balance of political power and 
result in a realignment. A generational realignment is not simply triggered by a new 
generation of voters entering the electorate, but by a new generation of voters who are 
united by a similar worldview or impacted by a common struggle or event, making them 
distinct from previous generations in some way.  
Due to their increasing potential to influence elections and play a role in shaping 
the nation’s political agenda for years to come, this thesis will examine how the 
Millennial generation’s views differ from previous generations and what this could mean 




Millennials are distinctly more Democratic with more progressive policy views as a result 
of unique generational factors that will persist throughout their lifetime and will cause an 
immindent political realignment.  
Little research has been done analyzing the prospect for a political realignment 
under the framework of the generational hypothesis, especially in relation to the 
Millennial generation. Considering the distinctiveness of this generation, I feel that this 
study is particularly significant.  
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This thesis operates on both two major theories that will be further examined: the 
realignment theory and the generational theory. The model of realignment I will be using 
to test my data derives from Arthur Paulson’s Electoral Realignment and the Outlook for 
American Democracy. Paulson states that the three elements of a realignment are: 1.) a 
new governing coalition, which is 2.) lasting/durable with 3.) a new policy agenda 
(Paulson 2007).  
Because I am interested in the role of Millennials in a future realignment, I will be 
applying a generational hypothesis to the realignment theory. This generational  
hypothesis suggests that unique political, economic, or social circumstances can shape an 
entire generations political views for their entire life (Mannheim 1928; Ryder 1965). The 
following section will review some of the relevant academic literature regarding both the 
realignment theory and the generational theory in order to provide a better understanding 






The concept of political realignment has been of interest to political scientists and 
scholars for decades, many debating whether or not the realignment theory remains 
relevant. While different versions of the theory have been formulated, one of the most 
recent defenses of the realignment theory was established by Arthur Paulson. He 
addressed many of the common objections to realignment (Paulson 2007). His 
publication responsed to David Mayhew, one of the most notable critics of the 
realignment theory (Mayhew 2002).  
Paulson dismissed the relevance of many of Mayhew’s claims, pointing out that 
Mayhew’s objections were largely based on old criteria that is not necessary to 
understanding the realignment theory. In addition, Paulson established a a more flexible, 
updated model of the realignment theory. Paulson’s theory of realignment will be the 
primary framework for this thesis.  
V.O. Key Jr. was among the first to formulate the theory of political realignment 
in his 1955 essay A Theory of Critical Elections (Key 1995). According to Key, a critical 
election results in “a sharp alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate” 
and forms “new and durable electoral groupings” (Key 1955). While this theory implies 
that realignments take place as a result of a single critical election, Key later expanded his 
theory in his 1969 publication, Secular Realignment and the Party System and established 
the theory “secular realignment” (Key 1969). Unlike a critical realignment, a secular 
realignment happens gradually over an extended period of time. 
Key acknowledged that “the rise and fall of parties may to some degree be the 




steps in a more or less continuous creation of new loyalties” (Key 1969). These trends 
can include an increase in immigration or the replacement of one generation by a new 
generation (Key 1969). While Key’s realignment theory has been widely supported and 
expanded over the years, it has faced criticism by some who believe that it is no longer 
relevant or applicable in the modern-day political system. 
Among the most prominent critics is David Mayhew, who published Electoral 
Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre in 2002 (Mayhew 2002). He addressed 
several of the criteria from different realignment theorists and concluded that the theory 
is nothing more than “an impediment of understanding.” Mayhew argues that it would be 
more accurate to assert that America’s political parties are in an era of dealignment, 
referring to the increasing number of independent voter identities (Mayhew 2002).  
In 2007, Arthur Paulson published his defense of the realignment theory, arguing that 
Mayhew’s criticisms of the theory, as well as all other criticisms “share two faults in their 
approach to realignment. They attribute to realignment theory observations that are not 
essential to the theory; and both treatments render the concept of realignment ahistorical 
(Paulson 2007).”  Rather than seeing this as a period of “dealignment,” he argues that 
“American political parties are being revived in new form.” He recognizes that “the party 
systems born in the nineteenth century have decayed, as have their coalitions of electoral 
support” (Paulson 2007).  
A large portion of Mayhew’s argument is based on criteria described in early theories 
of realignment, including the idea that realignments should occur according to a set time 
period (Mayhew 2002). According to this, he argues against the theory’s relevance due to 




they should.” He further states that “politics cannot be about waiting for electoral 
realignments or anything else” (Mayhew 2002). However, Paulson does not contend that 
realignments occur according to a certain schedule. He believes that it is a useful 
analytical tool to aid our understanding of political change (Paulson 2007).  
While Mayhew does acknowledge that 1932 “stands out for its durable realigning 
effects,” he argues that there has not been an election or a set of elections since that has 
produced the same effect (Mayhew 2002). Paulson disagrees with this claim. Not only 
does Paulson argue that a realignment has occurred since the 1930’s, he argued that it 
was the “most compelling electoral realignment in American history” due to the 
“disintegration of the solid South and the movement of most of its white voters from the 
Democrats to the Republicans in Presidential elections” (Paulson 2007).  
A fundamental element of Paulson’s theory is understanding that “a realignment 
should be understood contextually, in terms of the system of change it represents” 
(Paulson 2007). Paulson’s model emphasizes that realignments may not always occur in 
the same way or at the same rate, but it can still be a realignment, nonetheless (Paulson 
2007).  
Thomas Brunell and Bernard Grofman produced an earlier study that supports the 
flexibility of Paulson’s realignment model (Brunell and Grofman 1998). By using 
longitudinal comparisons to analyze state level data on state level US Senate delegations 
from 1788-1996, Brunell and Grofman identified cyclical patterns that indicated 
realignment during critical election years. While realignment theorists typically study 
national trends, Brunell and Grofman’s experiment revealed realignments that occurred at 




realignment can occur in one region while a Republican realignment can be occurring in 
another.  
Paulson’s theory removes some of the previously required criteria and simply states 
that a realignment will result in a “new and persistent governing coalition, yielding a new 
policy agenda” (Paulson 2007). While Paulson states that the result of a realignment will 
be a new governing coalition, a realignment begins with changes in the electoral 
coalitions (Paulson 2007). He states that “the shift of decisively large minorities” has the 
power to create a “new and ‘normal’ majority.”   
Paulson argues that “emerging electoral coalitions reflects varying combinations 
of vote switching, voter mobilization, and generational change” (Paulson 2007). These 
are three prominent causes of realignment among electoral coalitions. Realignment 
caused by vote switching, which is also referred to as “conversion,” occurs when voters 
who were once affiliated with one party switch or convert to the opposing party (Paulson 
2007). Realignment can also occur by mobilizing voters who were previously non-voters 
or did not have a strong allegiance to a specific party (Paulson 2007). 
 Generational change, also referred to as generational replacement, can cause a 
realignment when a new generation of young voters who have views that are distinct 
from the majority of society enter the electorate (Paulson 2007, Norpoth 1987). This 
leads to “the overall balance shifting as the new generation grows up and the older 








In order for a generational realignment to occur, a new generation of voters must 
emerge who are distinct form the majority of society; however, however, many doubt that 
Millennials today are different than young voters from previous generations, suggesting 
that young voters have consistently preferred Democratic candidates and have a tendency 
to favor more liberal policies and ideology. Differences between age groups are typically 
attributed to either life-cycle effects or generational effects.  
Life-cycle effects are influences that affect people when they are at a certain stage 
in their life and occur as a result of their age, while generational effects are unique factors 
that shape a generation’s behavior, views, and ideology. Generations can be influenced 
by certain demographics, social norms, economic conditions, or political events (PEW 
Research Center). This thesis provides support for the generational theory and against the 
life-cycle theory, arguing that Millennial’s political views and partisan identification are a 
result of unique generational factors that will persist throughout their lifetime.  
The idea behind the life-cycle theory is that people develop new priorities and 
preferences, which are typically more conservative as they age and enter different stages 
of their lives (Streig, and Bourg, & Riley). The life-cycle theory implies that there are 
universal roles or events that people will experience during their life and that each of 
these roles shape one’s views and beliefs. As an individual reaches adulthood, these 
events typically include having a family, buying a home, and reaching a point of financial 
stability (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1998). 
In 1962, John Crittenden published Aging and Party Affiliation where he 




1958), Crittenden used a cross-sectional analysis method to conclude that “the aging 
process has an impact on party affiliation that is independent of any such generational 
factors” (Crittenden 1962). However, Neal Cutler recognized a crucial misstep in 
Crittenden’s analysis. Rather than analyzing the ideological shifts of any specific age 
cohort or generation in order to examine whether a certain group of voters became more 
conservative over time due to aging, Crittenden compared people of the same age but 
from different generations (Cutler 1969).  
According to Cutler, studying generational trends, “can only take place in the 
context of repeated measurements of the same set of individuals” (Cutler 1969). In order 
to study this, one must use a cohort analysis method, which was developed in 1959 by 
William Evan as a way to examine generational differences in behavior or preferences 
(Evan 1959). Therefore, Cutler used a cohort analysis method to reanalyze the same 
survey data used in Crittenden’s analysis. Cutler’s study revealed evidence of a 
generational effect over time and no evidence of age leading to increasing conservativism 
(Cutler 1969).  
Following Cutler, researchers Norval Glenn and Ted Hefner further disproved 
Crittenden’s life-cycle theory in their own study (Glenn and Hefner 1972). They 
performed a cohort analysis using Gallup data over the course of twenty-four years 
(1945-1969) to analyze the development of party identification among age cohorts. They 
concluded that there was no evidence of aging leading to the development of 
conservative ideology or alignment with the Republican party (Glenn and Hefner 1972). 
Recent studies have continued to debunk the life-cycle theory, including a study by 




from the United States General Social Survey over a period of 25 years (1972-2004) and 
also concluded that aging effects had no impact on the development of conservative 
ideology (Danigelis, Hardy, and Cutler 2007).   
While both the life-cycle theory and the generational theory emphasize the 
importance of age in developing one’s political ideology, the generational theory is very 
different from the life-cycle theory. The concept of age in the generational theory is an 
important component because it implies that young people are more impressionable and 
the political views that one develops early in life are likely to last throughout an 
individual’s lifetime (Mannheim 1928). The durability of this theory has been tested 
many times and studies have continually shown that in most cases, an individual is likely 
to remain consistent in his or her partisan affiliation and political views with age.  
Peter Levine, Constance Flanagan and Les Gallay studied long-term generational 
trends in order to assess the extent of Millennials progressive identity and estimate the 
likelihood of it sustaining over time (Levine, Flanagan, and Gallay 2009). Concluding 
their research, they found that that: “Millennials have a more progressive identity than 
did previous generations at their age and are likely to move the country leftward on 
economic and social issues for decades to come” (Levine, Flanagan, and Gallay 2009).  
Duane Alwin and Jon Krosnick studied NES panel data over several decades and 
found that political ideology developed during early adulthood “appears to remain at a 
constant and high-level throughout the remainder of the life cycle” (Alwin and Krosnick 
1991). They also concluded that “party loyalties either increase or persist with age” 
(Alwin and Krosnick 1991). Gregory Markus provides an explanation for this effect, 




crucial importance in forming political outlooks because of the heightened sensitivity of 
cohort members during this formative life stage” (Markus 1983). Political Scientists 
Andrew Gelman and Yair Ghitza argued one’s teenage and early adult years are when 
most long-term political views are developed (Gelman and Ghitza 2014).   
Karl Mannheim made the distinction between members of a generation and 
members of a generational unit, insinuating that a generational unit is more than a group 
of people who were born within the same time frame, in the same region, and who exist 
together, but people who also participate in social movements and experience historical 
problems that are unique to their generation’s formative years (Mannheim 1928).  
Mannheim argues that early formative experiences have the potential to shape an 
entire generation’s worldview in a way that could influence their perspective for their 
entire lifetime (Mannheim 1928). Mannheim believes that being “exposed to social and 
intellectual symptoms of destabilization” can form a lasting bond among members of a 
generational unit and lead to the development of enduring characteristics and beliefs that 
are distinct from other generations (Mannheim 1928). 
Norman Ryder draws a similar distinction between cohorts and generations, 
stating that a cohort is a “group of persons born in the same time interval and aging 
together," while a generation shares not only cohort membership but also a unique 
consciousness and a distinct set of preferences and ideas (Ryder 1965). Ryder also 
emphasizes that an individual’s early years are critical for developing lasting beliefs and 
ideologies. He states that “the potential for change is concentrated in the cohorts of young 




but not old enough to have become committed to an occupation, a residence, a family of 
procreation, or a way of life” (Ryder 1965).  
In this thesis, I will be testing the theory that 1.) Millennials are a distinct 
generation with distinct experiences and characteristics; and 2.) that the Millennial 
generation will thus bring about a realignment that meets Paulson’s criteria of a “new and 
persistent governing coalition, yielding a new policy agenda” (Paulson 2007).  
 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
I am using existing sources of survey data in order to establish that Millennials are 
distinct from previous generations and represent: 1.) a new electoral coalition that will 2.) 
endure over time and 3.) establish a new policy agenda (Paulson 2007).  
According to the consensus among the academic literature, a generational 
realignment is likely to occur when a new generation of young voters enters the electorate 
with distinct political views and a strong preference for one party over the other. By using 
survey data to create data points over time, it will be easy to observe the long-term trends 
of each generation’s party identification and support for various policy-related issues. If 
the survey data reveals that Millennials have a tendency to align with the majority of the 
electorate, then it is unlikely that their increased participation will cause the balance of 
power to shift from one party to the other and cause a realignment. However, if it is 
evident that Millennials display significantly more or less supportive views for a certain 
party over time, it is likely that this will indicate which direction the balance of political 
power will shift towards as the they increase their participation in the electoral process 




The generational trends regarding partisan identification and policy views over 
time will indicate if Millennials are in fact a distinct generation with views that diverge 
from the general generational pattern, or if Millennials appear to present views that are 
consistent with previous generations. If Millennials tend to surge in their affiliation with 
the Democratic party or in their support for certain issues at a similar rate as other 
generations, then it is more likely that their views are explained by a national event, 
significant President, or political movement that impacts all voters equally, regardless of 
their generation.  
 
Chapter 4: Data 
I will be using survey data from the Pew Research Center which has tracked party 
identification trends from 1992-2017. The Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank 
that provides valuable, scientific research regarding American’s opinions on various 
issues over time through public opinion surveys and polling among other means. Because 
of the vast amount of content provided by Pew Research Center and the nonpartisan 
intent of the organization, I have chosen to use their data for my research.  
As part of their broad field of research, they have tracked each generation’s 
opinions on a variety of policies and political issues over time. The Pew Research Center 
defines Millennials as anyone born between 1981-1996 (Doherty, Kiley, and O’Hea 
2018). Those born between 1928-1945 are part of the Silent Generation; those born 
between 1946-1964 are part of the Baby Boomer Generation, and those born between 
1965-1980 are part of Generation X (Doherty, Kiley, and O’Hea 2018). Those who were 




information that has been collected from this generation, I will be focusing primarily on 
Millennials, Generation X, Baby Boomers, and the Silent Generation.      
For my analysis, I will be using the results from three survey questions that have 
been administered to members of each generation. The three topics that I will be 
examining are: granting citizenship to immigrants who came to the United States illegally 
as children; same-sex marriage; and expanding the role and responsibility of the federal 
government. These are three questions that have been asked consistently over time; 
therefore, there is data over a number of years recording each generation’s response to 
these specific statements. I also chose these three questions because they represent three 
very different but widely contested issues.  
 
Chapter 5: Discussion 
A Lasting New Coalition 
While it is not uncommon to see a contrast between younger voters and older voters, 
the divide between Millennials and older generations in regard to to party identification 
and policy issues presents the largest generational gap to exist in American politics (Pew 
Research Center 2018). This divide became evident following the 2008 Presidential 
election when party identification among 18-29-year-olds. reached a 19-point-gap, 
separating those who affiliated with the Democratic party (45%) and those who affiliated 
with the Republican party (26%). This was a dramatic shift from 2000, when the 
difference between party identification was almost evenly split. These trends have only 





The generational trends in party identification reveal a significant shift in partisan 
affiliation. In Table 1, which tracks the percentage of registered voters in each generation 
that have identified as Democrats or leaned Democratic from 1992-2017, it is clear that 
the three older generations (the Silent Generation, Baby Boomers, and Generation X) 
tend to remain closely aligned over time. This is true in both Table 1 which tracks 
Democratic party affiliation and in Table 2 which shows the percentage in generation that 
have identified as Republican or lean Republican. While party identification does vary 
slightly over time among the Silent Generation, Baby Boomers, and Generation X, the 
variation remains very small. As reflected in the tables, the three older generations shift 
either left or right only by small margins and typically do so in the same direction and at 
the same time. 
The contrast is clear, however, when Millennials become part of the picture in 2004, 
as 53 percent of Millennial voters identified as Democrats or leaned Democratic (Table 
3). This resulted in only 38 percent of Millennial voters identifying as Republican or 
leaning Republican in 2004. Similarly, when the Pew Research Center started tracking 
these trends in 1992, only 38 percent of Silents affiliated with the Republican party; 
however, this was the only time that any generation identified with the Republican party 
at such a low rate (Table 6). Even in this case, the Silent generation increased their 
Republican/Lean Republican identification to 45 percent by 1994.  
Millennials did not have the same change of heart for the Republican party. Indeed, 
the percentage of Republican/lean Republican Millennials continued to drop to 30 
percent in 2008 while their Democratic identification rose in 2008 to 61 percent. This 




50 percent of Baby Boomers, and 48 percent of the Silents identified as Democrat/lean 
Democrat (Tables 4-6). The Democratic enthusiasm of 2008, however, should not 
discount the significant surge in support reflected by the Millennial generation. These 
findings present evidence that Millennials expressed a higher tendency to identify with 
the Democratic party from the moment that they entered the electorate and have 
continued to exceed other generations in their Democratic affiliation over time (Table 1). 
 
Generational Change  
To contribute Millennials partisian affiliation to their youth does not explain the stark 
divide between Millennials and the other generations. If party identification was a 
product of one’s age, then there would be far more significant differences between Gen 
Xers, Baby Boomers, and Silents over time. Instead, it appears that when one of the three 
older generations increased in support for one party, the other two followed at around the 
same time. This indicates that the changes in party identifiation within Gen Xers, Baby 
Boomers, and Silents are likely a response to the President’s popularity, current events, 
and the political climate.   
However, it is evident that the generational theory is the best explaination for 
Millennial’s significant level of support for the Democratic party. If Millennials party 
identification could be explained by the life-cycle theory, then Millennials partisan 
affiliation should follow a similar pattern to previous generations when they were 
younger. This is not the case, however. At this time, Silents were 47-to-64-years-old, 
Baby Boomers were 24-to-42-years-old, and eligble Generation X voters were 18-26-




their entire political lifetime thus far, as well as most of Baby Boomers. If it were true 
that party identification is a result of one’s age and can be explained by the life-cyle 
theory, then Millennial’s party identification over time should be relatively similar to Gen 
Xer’s and Baby Boomer’s party identification over time.   
According to the academic literature and numerous studies which confirm the 
stability of party identification, it seems clear that Millennial’s strong support shown very 
early for the Democratic party is likely to persist throughout their lifetime. Equally as 
significant as Millennials distinctly Democratic identification and progressive policy 
views is that the generation appears to be united in these respects. Older generations have 
had a tendency to show vast intergenerational differences (Milbank 2016). Baby 
Boomers, for example, have typically been split between those born before 1954 who 
leaned more Democratic and those born after 1954 who have been more likely to lean 
Republican (Milbank 2016). While the Baby Boomers might have been equal in their 
share of the electorate when they were the age of Millennials, they only made half the 
impact. Because it appears that the majority of Millennials are unified in their partisan 
identification and policy views, their ability to form a lasting majority coalition is that 
much stronger. 
 
New Priorities  
One problem with the life-cycle theory is that it insinuates that most people will fulfill 
traditional roles, experience certain life events, and follow a generic timeline throughout 
their lifetime. This typically includes getting married and having children, buying a home 




shows that most Millennials are straying away from the traditional timeline that might be 
expected of them.  
In 2015, only 8 percent of 18-to-24-year-old Millennials and 44 percent of 24-to-34-
year-old Millennials were married; however, 29 percent of 18-to-24-year-old Baby 
Boomers and 68 percent of 24-to-34-year-old Baby Boomers were married in 1980. 
While most Silent men and women were married by ages 21-to-23, the average age for 
Millennials to marry in 2018 was 28-to-30. This has likely led to Millennials starting 
families later in life. In 2016, 48 percent of 20-to-35-year-old Millennials were mothers, 
compared to 58 percent of Gen Xers in 2000 and 58 percent of Baby Boomers in 1984.  
One explanation for this is the increasing importance of higher education. As the most 
highly educated generation, Millennials are delaying marriage and children and going to 
school at much higher rates and for much longer periods of time than previous 
generations. As of 2018, 38 percent of Millennials between the age of 25-to-37 received 
at least a Bachelor’s degree compared to only 15 percent of Silents in 1968; 25 percent of 
Baby Boomers in 1989; and 29 percent of Gen Xers in 2000 (Bialik and Fry 2019). Even 
more prominent within the generational contrast is the gender contrast. Millennial women 
in 2018 were nearly four times more likely to have obtained a college education 
compared to women in the Silent Generation at the same age (Bialik and Fry 2019). 
According to projections, white people with college degrees are expected to make up 
23 percent of the electorate in 2020, a small increase from 22 percent in 2016 (Cilluffo 
and Fry 2019). In a slightly more significant shift, white people without college degrees 




electorate in 2020 (Cilluffo and Fry 2019). These are small percentage points, but these 
changes represent long-term trends that benefit Democratic party. 
Over the past twenty years (from 1997-2017), the percentage of college educated 
people and minorities has increased in the United States while the percentage of white 
people without college degrees has decreased. During the same time period, the 
Republican candidate has lost the popular vote in four out of five elections (Bacon, Jr. 
and Mehta 2018). In other words, if current trends continue, it is likely that as older, 
white, non-educated voters decrease, so will Republican support.  
The cost of being the most highly educated generation, however, is not cheap. From 
1998 when Gen Xers were 20-to-35-years-old,  until 2016 when Millennials were the 
same age, student debt in America doubled (Bialik and Fry 2019). As of 2018, the 
Federal Reserve reported that people under 35 were responsible for nearly half of the 
$1.5 trillion in outstanding student loans (Thompson and Merchant 2018). Even as they 
are paying more for their education, college-educated Millennials today make less than 
members of previous generations with a college degree at the same age.  
 
New Challenges 
Many of the unique economic challenges that Millennials face today are a result of 
the Great Recession. Though it began in 2007 and ended in 2009, it was not until 2011 
that the economy reached pre-recession figures. Millennials continue to face the 
repercussions more so than any other generation. The employment rate among students 




hit those not enrolled in school even harder, dropping from 73.2 percent to 65 percent 
(Taylor, et al., 2015). 
The economy’s slow recovery has resulted in Millennials facing higher rates of 
poverty and lower rates of employment than experienced by Generation X, Baby 
Boomers, or the Silent generation at the same age (Bialik and Fry 2019). The percentage 
of 18-to-24-year-old’s in poverty increased from 12 percent in 1980 to 20 percent in 
2015; and the percentage of 24-to-34 year old’s in poverty increased from 9 percent in 
1980 to 15 percent in 2015 (Shambaugh, Lauer, and Breitwieser 2017).  
These conditions have resulted in a clear difference in economic status and security 
between young adults today and young adults in previous generations. Millennials in 
2016 who were between the age of 20-to-25 had accumulated significantly less wealth 
than Baby Boomers when they were the same age. The median net worth of Millennial 
households was around $12,500 in 2016, compared to $20,700 when Baby Boomers were 
the same age in 1983 (Bialik and Fry 2019). It is no surprise that this has led to a decrease 
in the percentage of young homeowners. In 1980, 55 percent of those between the age of 
25-to-34 were homeowners, compared to only 39 percent in 2015 (Bialik and Fry 2019).  
 
New Demographics 
One of the defining aspects of the Millennial generation is their diversity. Only 55 
percent of Millennials are white; 21 percent are Hispanic; 13 percent are African 
American; and 7 percent are Asian (Bialik and Fry 2019). This is a large contrast from 
the demographics of older generations when they were the same age. In 1980, 78 percent 




2019). Almost 1 in 7 Millennial marriages are biracial; compared 1 in 20 Baby Boomer 
marriages when they were the same age (Bialik and Fry 2019). Millennials are the most 
diverse generation yet, followed by Generation Z who will be even more diverse. 
The diversity that Millennials and Generation Z will bring to the electorate is likely to 
have a significant impact on who is elected. The majority of the electorate has always 
been composed of white voters; however, that share of the electorate is consistently is 
declining. The share of the white voters in the electorate dropped from 77 percent in 2004 
to 74 percent in 2008. It reduced further from 72 percent in 2012 to 70 percent in 2016 
(Adams 2019).  
According to voting trends expert Bruce Gyory’s “Double 75” rule: “outside the Deep 
South, whenever the white vote in a state or nationally shrinks to 75 percent or less of the 
total vote, and the Democrats can carry 75 percent or more of the aggregate minority 
vote, the Republicans have no margin for error” (Gyory 2016). Both the 2012 and 2016 
election confirmed his theory. When Barack Obama defeated Mitt Romney relatively 
comfortably in 2012 (51% to 47%), white voters were 72 percent of the electorate, while 
Obama won 79 percent of the minority vote (Phillips 2016). In 2016 when white voters 
were 70 percent of the electorate, Hillary Clinton received only 73 percent of the 
minority vote (Zingher 2018).  
Recent election results and demographic data provide further support that a more 
diverse electorate will benefit the Democratic party. In the 2018 elections, 92 percent of 
African-American voters under thirty supported Democratic candidates; as well as 80 
percent of young Latino voters (CIRCLE 2018). White voters under thirty also supported 




Chapter 5: The Millennial Policy Agenda 
As Paulson states: “the new governing coalition seats new directions in public policy 
and redefines the salient issues of American politics for an extended period of time” 
(Paulson 2007). It is clear that a Millennial majority will mean the advancement of a 
progressive policy agenda. From the survey data, it appears that the overall electorate has 
grown increasingly more supportive of the issues reflected in Tables 7-9; however, 
Millennials have consistently shown a higher degree of support than other generations. 
While the degree of support within the Silent Generation, Baby Boomers, and Generation 
X fluctuates over time, the difference between the three remains small. The gap that 
exists between the Millennial generation and the three older generations, however, 
provides compelling evidence for an impending realignment.   
 
A More Active Government  
Millennials have historically been far more likely to see the need for government 
assistance. Table 7 reflects Millennial’s consistent support for the idea that “the 
government should have a bigger role in providing services and regulations.” Even in 
2007, 68 percent of Millennials agreed with this statement (Pew Research Center 2018). 
The majority of Millennials (56%) and Gen Xers (53%) agreed in 2017 that “the 
government should do more to help the needy, even in the case that it means going 
further into debt.” While 48 percent of Baby Boomers agreed, 45 percent still insisted 





Millennials have also held a consistent view regarding the government’s 
responsibility to ensure healthcare for all; as 61 percent of 18-to-29-year-old Millennials 
were in favor of a government-provided health care plan in 2008 while 56 percent of 18-
to-29-year-old’s in Generation X were opposed to this in 1978 (Pew Research Center 
2018). More recently in 2017, 67 percent of Millennials believed that it was the 
government’s responsibility to ensure healthcare for all (Pew Research Center 2018). 
Support for government-provided healthcare has not always been a “young” person issue. 
In the 1970s, the age group that showed the most support for a government-provided 
healthcare plan were those 60 and older.  
Because the Silent Generation, Baby Boomers, and some of the older members of 
Generation X grew up in a world where you could “pull yourself up by your bootstraps” 
and be successful, it is easy to see how this shaped their fiscally conservative views 
regarding individual financial responsibility. But the economic conditions facing 
Millennials are very different than what older generations experienced. The concept of 
the American Dream is much more of a fantasy today than it once was. This is a 
generation that has come of age in an economy where it is far more difficult to make ends 
meet, which has likely influenced Millennials views on policy in a way that will last 
throughout their lifetime.  
The Pew Research Center has shown that people who were eighteen during the New 
Deal Era, making them part of the Greatest Generation, were consistently more 
supportive of the Democratic party and of economically liberal policies than other 
generations throughout their lifetime. In 1994 when they were the oldest age cohort (ages  




Center 2015). This further debunks the life-cycle theory, proving that Democratic 
affiliation is not a result of one’s youth, but likely a result of the experiences that shape 
one’s generation.  
Coming of age during the Great Depression, the Greatest Generation experienced dire 
economic conditions first hand. These tough times were followed by a series of New 
Deal legislation implemented by a Democratic President and Congress that paved the 
way for economic recovery. These relief programs were not looked down upon as 
“handouts” for people who simply did not want to work, they were crucial in order for 
the majority of Americans to survive. While the economy did recover over time, many of 
the programs that were introduced during the New Deal Era remain in place today and 
continue to be a part of the Democratic party’s policy agenda.  
The Greatest Generation remained supportive of the Democratic party and of these 
programs throughout their lifetime, likely because they had a personal experience which 
made them understand the need for federal assistance. Their dependence on relief 
programs was not by any fault of their own. It is clear that these early life experiences 
had a lasting effect on the Greatest Generation’s policy views and their political 
affiliation, and could likely have a similar effect on the Millennial generation, as well.  
 
A More Inclusive Nation 
While each generation has shown more favorable views regarding same-sex marriage 
over time, Table 8 shows that Millennials have consistently been the most supportive. 
Even in 2007, 53 percent of Millennials supported same-sex marriage while 42 percent of 




Research Center 2018). In 2017, still less than half of the Silent Generation supported 
same-sex marriage (Table 8). The majority of each of the other generations do show more 
supportive views, however. In 2017, 56 percent of Baby Boomers and 65 percent of Gen 
Xers were supportive. Millennials continued to show the largest percentage of support at 
73 percent (Pew Research Center 2018).  
Similarly, Millennials are the only generation that has continually shown positive 
views in regards to immigration. Table 9 reflects each generations support for “granting 
permanent legal status to immigrants who came illegally to the U.S. when they were 
children.” In 2017, the majority of each generation showed support, while Millennials 
remained the most supportive with 82% in favor (Pew Research Center 2018).  Further, 
another survey revealed that 72 percent of Millennials and 60 percent of Generation X 
were opposed to “substantially expanding the wall along the U.S. border with Mexico;” 
reflecting a far more negative view than the 49 percent of Baby Boomers and 47 percent 
of those in the Silent Generation who were opposed to the border wall (Pew Research 
Center 2018).  
In 2017, however, 79% of Millennials, 66% of Generation X, and 56% of Baby 
Boomers agreed that “immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard 
work and talents” (Pew Research Center 2018).  Less than half (47%) of the Silent 
Generation held this view, however. There has been considerable progress since 1994, 
first year that this question was asked (Pew Research Center 2018). Only 29 percent of 
the Silent Generation, 31 percent of Baby Boomers, and 36 percent of Generation X 




 While millennials have grown up in a largely diverse nation, America’s racial and 
ethnic composition largely began transforming once the Silent generation and Baby 
Boomers reached their adult years. Many members of the older generations have had to 
adjust to the changing demographics of our country, prompting feelings of fear, 
resentment, or discomfort. Millennials, on the other hand, have come of age in a country 
that is far more racially and ethnically diverse than previous generations and is growing 
increasingly more diverse. 
In many ways, the older generations’ disapproval of or inability to accept certain 
people, ideas, or policies that are popular among the Millennial generation can be 
understood their resistance to anything that is unconventional or unfamiliar. In 2015, the 
Public Religion Research Institute asked:  “Since the 1950s, do you think American 
culture and way of life has mostly changed for the better or, or has it mostly changed for 
the worst?” The results of this question revealed a stark generational divide, as 55 percent 
of those between the age of 18-34 said “for the better;” opposed to 56 percent of those 
between the age of 35-54 and 56 percent of those 55 years and older who said “for the 
worst” (PRRI 2015).  
Many of the priorities of conservatives today consist of limiting government as much 
as possible, advocating for individual financial responsibility, promoting traditional 
family values, and protecting the rights and the norms that were established long ago and 
that they believe make this country “great.” However, the “great” country that they long 
for is a version of America that very specifically did not welcome many of the people, the 





Chapter 6: The Case for a Millennial Realignment:  
The New Deal Majority 
One of the most notable and agreed upon eras of realignment led to the New Deal 
Majority (Reagan 1996). Key argues that the realignment began during the 1928 
Presidential election when Republican Herbert Hoover defeated Democrat Alfred Smith 
(Key 1955). Paulson agrees, referring to this as a “converting election.” Because Alfred 
Smith’s platform was able to resonate with Catholic, working-class, and urban voters, 
Paulson argues that the 1928 Presidential election resulted in “an altered electoral 
coalition” (Paulson 2007).  
The increase in Democratic support surged even more in 1932 which was an 
indisputable victory for the Democrats (Reagan 1996). Franklin Roosevelt defeated 
incumbent Herbert Hoover in the Presidential election while the Democrats won 103 
seats in the House of Representatives and 12 seats in the Senate (Reagan 1996). While 
many aspects contributed to this realignment, one factor that made it possible for the 
Democrats to maintain power for such a long period of time was their ability to appeal to 
a broader group of voters and expand their coalition. During a time of economic crisis 
and instability, Roosevelt appealed to the needs of the people that the Republican party 
had failed to acknowledge. These people included the working class, immigrants, and 
some racial minorities (Reagan 1996).  
Each of these groups were united by Roosevelt’s platform emphasizing economic 
recovery and his willingness to take federal action in order to help those who were most 
affected by the Great Depression. Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation established programs 




Labor Standards Act (Reagan 1996). The Democrats maintained their majority in both 
chambers for fourteen years following this election and continued to win Presidential 
elections for five consecutive terms (Reagan 1996). The fifth Presidential victory 
occurred in 1948 during the election of Harry Truman (Reagan 1996).  
 
The Reagan Revolution 
Though Democrats lost control of the White house in 1952 with the election of 
Dwight Eisenhower, they maintained their control in both the House and Senate and 
quickly regained the Presidency when John F. Kennedy was elected in 1960 (Paulson 
2007). While these might have been taken as signs that the  Democratic majority was 
secure, it soon faced conservative backlash. Paulson argues that the 1964 Presidential 
election represented the disintegration of the New Deal Era (Paulson 2007).  
Despite Lyndon Johnsons’ landslide victory against Barry Goldwater, Paulson 
claims that the groundwork was being laid during this election for a conservative 
majority that would fully emerge in the 1980s and would last for several years (Paulson 
2007). While Goldwater lost the election, he played a huge part in laying that 
groundwork and in bringing the conservative majority to fruition.  
In 1960, Barry Goldwater published “The Conscience of a Conservative,” which 
established the philosophy for the modern Republican party (Castle 1990). He stated: 
“Politics is the art of achieving the maximum amount of freedom for individuals that is 
consistent with the maintenance of social order” (Castle 1990). He addressed the 
criticism that conservative ideas were ‘outdated’ by arguing that, “to suggest that the 




Commandments or Aristotle’s Politics are out of date” (Castle 1990). He followed by 
stating: “The laws of God, and of nature, have no dateline” (Castle 1990). Goldwater not 
only foreshowed the mainstream Republican platform, but provided the philosophy that is 
used to justify it.  
According to Paulson, the most important realigning effect of this era was the 
transformation of the parties’ electoral coalitions which occurred as black voters shifted 
away from the Republican party and white Southerners distanced themselves from the 
Democratic party (Paulson 2007). Peniel Joseph, a historian at Tufts University, claims 
that Barry Goldwater was the force that drove the black community towards the 
Democratic party (Bates 2014). When he ran against Johnson in 1964, he received only 6 
percent of the black vote (Bates 2014).  
For comparison, Richard Nixon received 32 percent of the black vote in 1960 
when he unsuccessfully challenged John F. Kennedy and Dwight Eisenhower received 39 
percent of the black vote when he was elected in 1956 (Bates 2014). Goldwater’s 
“Southern Strategy,” which aimed specifically at appealing to white Southerners, became 
the blueprint for Republican Presidential candidates (Bates 2014). It would soon lead 
Richard Nixon to victory against Hubert Humphrey in what was one of the closest 
Presidential elections in U.S. history in 1968 (Bates 2014). 
In the Presidential election of 1972, Richard Nixon faced a much easier challenge 
when he was re-elected 60.7 percent to 37.5 percent against Democratic cantante George 
McGovern (Hughes 2018). Despite McGovern’s loss, Judis and Teixeira argue that this 
election “foreshadowed a new Democratic majority in the twenty-first century” (Judis 




highly-skilled professionals, racial minorities, and young people. Further, they argue that 
the “Conservative Republican Majority” began to disintegrate in 1992 and that a new 
majority would begin to emerge “through birth, immigration, and economic change” 
(Judis and Teixeira 2002). They projected that a new Democratic coalition would fully 
come to fruition between during the first decade of the twenty-first century (Judis and 
Teixeira 2002). However, many began to doubt the future of an emerging Democratic 
majority after the 2016 Presidential election. 
 However, just as African Americans did not leave the Republican party without 
cause and the South did not become a Republican stronghold for no reason, Donald 
Trump’s election was no coincidence. His candidacy met a certain need for a specific 
group of the electorate, which was largely older, non-college educated, white voters. 
Those who grew accustomed to traditional norms and policies found comfort in a 
message that incited nostalgia and provided hope for making America what it once was. 
Boston College Historian Heather Cox Richardson argues that Trump “used the dog-
whistle language that movement conservatives have used to hang on to power since 
Richard Nixon’s “Southern strategy” in the 1960s” and that he was “playing to a 
population that movement conservatives have been grooming for a generation, but he 
himself is not a movement conservative.” 
Goldwater’s campaign was influential in the development of the “Southern 
Strategy” which led to formation of the modern conservative coalition. From Nixon, to 
Reagan, to Donald Trump, Republican Presidential candidates have continuously utilized 
this approach to appeal to a specific group of supporters. Even in cases when the 




older, white voters was reliable, both in the South and elsewhere. The problem facing the 
Republican party is not that this strategy is failing to mobilize their target group of voters, 
but that they are appealing to a consistently declining share of the electorate. Meanwhile, 
the voters that the Republican party have consistently disregarded are increasingly 
becoming the majority.   
 
The Emerging Millennial Coalition 
Both of the eras of realignment discussed fulfill the requirements of Paulson’s 
criteria, representing 1.) a new governing or electoral coalition that is 2.) durable and 
lasting; and that has a 3.) new policy agenda. Further, from viewing the concept of 
realignment though a historical framework, it provides a better way of understanding the 
changes taking place in the current political era. While there were various causes that led 
to the New Deal Majority and the Reagan Revolution, it does not appear evident to me 
that generational replacement was among the leading factors. However, I would argue 
that based on the contrast Millennial’s political views and the views of previous 
generations, Millennials will be a driving force in realigning the system. I would even 
argue that generational realignment could have a stronger potential to shift the balance of 
power from one party to another due to the large number of new voters entering the 
electorate through generational change.  
Though I am unsure of when a new Democratic majority will come to fruition, 
evidence of a Millennial realignment is already underway. While the vast majority of this 
thesis has focused on their role in shaping a new electoral coalition, the Millennial 




2018 midterm elections, the average member of the United States House of 
Representatives was 57 years old; while the average United States Senator was 61 (Pew 
Research Center 2018). The Millennial generation has nearly doubled their representation 
in Congress, from only 14 members to 30 members.  
There are few people who represent this change in generational leadership as well 
as Mayor Pete Buttiegieg of South Bend Indiana who could be the first Millennial 
President of the United States in 2020. His candidacy itself is a testament to the desire 
that this nation needs for new leadership. For far too long, issues that are impacting 
young people today have been placed on the backburner by politicians who will not be 
around to face their repercussions. 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
By using Paulson’s criteria, I have demonstrated that 1.) Millennials are an 
enduring electoral coalition with a 2.) new policy agenda, thus providing evidence to 
support an impending realignment. Facing a distinct set of economic conditions and 
growing up in an increasingly diverse society has inevitably played a role in Millennial’s 
political views. The widening generational gap regarding policy preferences is likely to 
influence policy on the national scale for years to come as  Millennials take a larger role 
and begin to shape the policy agenda. While it is not clear exactly how soon Millennial 
and Generation Z voters will outnumber older voters at the polls and have the power to 
control the outcome of elections, it is evident that it is in the future. 
Because race is such an essential component for understanding the changes taking 




examine the political views and characteristics within the Millennial generation, 
particularly comparing Millennials of different races. Limited by time and due to the 
more broad scope of my research question, this thesis focused very little on the 
intergenerational differences that might occur between Millennials.   
While I do not suggest that the Republican party will inevitably become extinct as a 
result of generational replacement, the data presented in this thesis does make it seem 
likely that the party’s current coalition will be outnumbered sooner rather than later. 
America is changing, and in order to appeal to the country’s new constituency, candidates 
and parties may have to alter their strategies and platforms. With that being said, it is the 
responsibility of the Republican Party and its leadership to evolve and meet the needs of 
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